The conventional ghost-imaging-based encryption (GIE) scheme has low-quality decrypted images and unsatisfied security. In this paper, we propose to cope with these issues using customized data container and exclusive-OR (XOR) operation. The proposal constitutes two security levels. The first level includes transforming the primary information into a binary signal (i.e., bit stream) under the ASCII standard and XORing it with the key bit stream. In the second step, the result in the first level is codified into an elaborate data container, which is then sent to the GIE scheme. The proposed approach not only possesses high security but ensures lossless recovery of the primary information as well. Its validity and feasibility have been supported by a series of numerical results.
Introduction
Over the past several decades, optical technology has shown great potential for information security due to its particular characters, such as inherent parallelism, light speed processing, and multiple degrees of freedom [1] - [14] . Numerous encryption approaches based on it have been developed since Refregier and Javidi first reported the double random phase encryption (DRPE) in 1995 [15] . The DRPE employs two random phase keys in both of the input and Fourier planes of an optical 4f scheme to encrypt the data into stationary white noise. Inspired by the invention of DRPE, some novel optical cryptosystems based on other classical optical architectures, such as joint transform correlator [16] , holographic setup [17] , and diffractive imaging scheme [18] , have been successfully developed. Lately, Javidi et al. present an overview of the potential, advances, and challenges of optical security and encryption using free space optics [19] .
Although optical security has made rapid progress in the past decades, it confronts the noise problem. In other words, the recovered plaintexts in coherent optical cryptosystems always suffer from speckle noise. In order to deal with this issue, Barrera et al. introduce, for the first time, the concept of information "container" before a standard optical encrypting procedure and experimentally demonstrate the practicality of the Quick Response (QR) code [20] , [21] . Thereafter, the application of QR code has successfully solved several puzzles in optical security area [22] - [24] . More recently, Zea et al. explored a type of customized data container as an alternative of the QR code [25] , pursuing larger noise tolerance and higher information capacity. The customized data container exhibits obvious merits over the QR code and it can be employed for the design of high performance optical cryptosystems.
Recently, ghost-imaging-based encryption (GIE) has become a promising alternative of the above mentioned approaches [26] - [36] . The GIE inherits the merits of ghost imaging, including needless of imaging lens and freedom from adverse operation conditions. Furthermore, its ciphertexts are intensity vectors rather than complex-valued matrix, which are very convenient for storage and transmission [26] . However, It is found that at least two problems that hinder its further applications. The first one is the low quality of the decrypted images [26] - [30] . The retrieved information in GIE is usually noisy images, and this is inadaptable for applications that require high decryption quality. Consequently, people tend to use it for information authentication [31] - [33] . Another problem is its security risk, as Yuan et al. have recently pointed out its vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) [36] , which originates from the linearity of itself. In order to solve these two problems simultaneously, we propose here a novel approach for information encryption in GIE by aid of customized data container and exclusive-OR (XOR) operation. Before being sent to the conventional GIE, the primary information is XORed with the key bit stream and codified into a customized data container. We shall show that the data container can protect the original information from noise and the XOR operation can effectively enhance the system security. In addition, the comparison of our data container with another typical container, namely the QR code, also demonstrates its superiority.
Theoretical Analysis

The GIE Scheme
The schematic setup for illustrating GIE is depicted in Fig. 1 . The wave from the laser is collimated by a lens and then illuminate the space light modulator (SLM), which is controlled by computer to introduce a series of independent random-phase profiles as the secret keys. Thereafter, the beam passes through a beam splitter, generating the two spatially correlated beams required for ghost imaging. One of the beams propagates to the CCD camera, where its intensity I m (ξ, η) is recorded. I m (ξ, η) can be calculated by [36] where P m (x, y) (m = 1,2 . . . N) stand for the N phase only profiles, λ is the wavelength, and z is the distance between the SLM and the CCD. Another beam passes through the transparent area of an object according to a transmission function of T (ξ, η), and the collected intensities measured by the bucket detector can be expressed by
In order to reconstruct the ghost image of the object, the intensity at the object plane are correlated with the ciphertexts B mT
whereT (ξ, η) denotes the recovered object, and B denotes the ensemble average.
Customized Data Container for GIE
Recently, people developed several containers to deal with the noise, such as the speckle noise, in the recovered output of practical optical cryptosystems. Barrera et al. first introduced the QR code to the DRPE and realize the lossless recovery of the primary information [20] . Later, their research group invent the customized data container for optical security [25] . The basic unit of their container is a binary 3 × 3 square arrangement of nine white square blocks, and each square stands for a bit. Taking the outcome of a typical GIE into account, we develop a similar customized optical data container (CODC) for it, which can be regarded as a variation of Zea's container and is displayed in Fig. 2(a) . The container consists of 12 × 12 squares, each of which has a size of 3 × 3 pixels and represents a bit. The value of this bit is decided by the average of the nine pixels, and it is identified as 1 or 0 when the average is greater or smaller than a predefined threshold. For conciseness, we refer to this procedure as threshold-judging recognition. The distance between two neighbor squares is 10pixels [see Fig. 2(b) ]. The color of the square is white or black when it stands for 1 or 0 respectively. Obviously, Fig. 2 (a) denotes a bit stream whose elements are all ones. For both encoding and decoding, the code is read left to right and top to bottom. We show in Fig. 2 (c) a magnified square to illustrate the nine pixels. For convenience, we employ ASCII standard to express the traditionally used symbols in this paper. It is obvious that our container contains 144 bits information, and it will include 18 characters in application. Generally speaking, it is not cost effective to transform bit string to binary images in signal processing, but it is meaningful to do this concerning the parallelism and light speed of an optical system. It is also very interesting to compare our container with that of Zea et al. The obvious difference between them lies in that the two adjacent squares separate sufficiently far from each other, coping with the heavy noise in GIE. Therefore, Zea's container is more compact and is able to carry more information in actual applications. Nevertheless, in Zea's container, only 8 bits carry data, and the ninth is ignored. This means there is one wasted bit in each basic unit. By contrast, the squares in the present container can be entirely utilized since the quantity of them is exactly 18 times the length of an ASCII code (i.e., 8 bits).
XOR Encryption and the Proposal
The XOR is a well-known Boolean operator processing binary signals, and XOR function returns true when the values of the two arguments are different. Assume a and b are binary valued variables, the XOR operator has the following property:
This property can be utilized to encrypt binary signals. Let s represent the bit stream to be encrypted and k represent the key. The ciphertext can be calculated by perform XOR on the corresponding bits of them:
For decryption, the plaintext can be easily recovered by using
In this paper, our proposal include two security levels. First, the primary information is transformed to the corresponding ASCII code and then XORed with a bit stream key. Second, the encoded result is introduced into the CODC and further encrypted in the GIE scheme. The decryption is a simple inverse of the encryption.
Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we will demonstrate the proposed optical encryption approach with numerical results. The computer simulations are based on the GIE shown in Fig. 1 and the CODC depicted in Fig. 2 . The wavelength of the illuminating light is 632 nm. The axial distance between the SLM and the object is 5.0 cm. The values of the random-phase profiles are randomly distributed in [0, 2π] and the size of them is 128 × 128 pixels. The message "NYNU Ghost Imaging" that contains18 characters, including two spaces, are chosen as the information for test. The input codified into the CODC is regarded as the plaintext and shown in Fig. 3(a) . We randomly generate a bit stream as the key bit stream and show it in Fig. 3(b) . It should be pointed that the primary information and the key bit stream are not necessary to be encoded into the CODC, and thus, Figs. 3(a) and (b) are given only for explaining the proposal. By performing the XOR operation on the plaintext and the key, we get the XOR encoding results [XOR-ER, Fig. 3(c) ] in the first security level.
The results shown in Fig. 3(c) is further encrypted by the GIE, whose optical setup has been displayed in Fig. 1 . The random phase profiles, together with the key bit stream, are saved as secret keys. Fig. 4(a) shows the decrypted XOR-ER when all parameters are correct and 4000 measurements are used. To objectively estimate the decrypted result, we calculate the correlation coefficient (CC) between the recovered image f r and the primary image f . It is defined as
where E[] is the expectation value. The coordinates are omitted here for brevity. The CC value for Fig. 4(a) is 0.4528. Although the decrypted image seems obscure, the threshold-judging recognition can recover its primary form exactly, which is displayed in Fig. 4(b) . The plaintext in the form of CODC can therefore be constructed by XORing this result with the key bit stream, and the retrieved plaintext is displayed in Fig. 4(c) . It is seen in Fig. 4 (c) that its content is identical with that of Fig. 3(a) , and thus we have totally retrieved the primary in the form of CODC. Thereafter, transforming the bit stream into characters under the ASCII standard, we successfully reconstruct the primary information [see Fig. 4(d) ]. The feasibility of the proposal can be claimed to be verified. For comparison, we produce a binary image, as well as a QR code that contains the same message, which are also with sizes of 128 × 128 pixels and are shown, respectively, in Fig. 5(a) and (b). They are both encrypted with the GIE scheme depicted in Fig. 1 and the corresponding decrypted results with 4000 measurements are shown in Fig. 5(c) and (d) , respectively. It is seen from Fig. 5(c) that it is of rather low quality and can hardly be distinguished by naked eyes, and the CC value for it is 0.3995. The situation is even worse with the QR code, which is shown in Fig. 5(d) . The decrypted QR code (CC = 0.4227) suffers significant degradation and it thus reading fails. In other words, the primary information will be totally lost if we choose the QR code as the container. It can be concluded that our method shows obvious advantage over the conventional and the QR-based method in the quality of the recovered primary information. It should also be pointed out that the above results are obtained by simulations rather than actual experiments. Therefore, there may be some difficulties and limitations in experimental realization. For instance, the number of measurements in GIE will be more than 4000 for correct decryption due to the system noise. Furthermore, although the container is designed to carry 144 characters, its actual capacity depends mainly on the system noise and the performance of SLM and CCD (i.e., resolution, active area, etc.)
For GIE, it is rather important to ensure the system security even if an unauthorized receiver has obtained partial information related to the encryption keys (i.e., P m ). In the method described in [26], if an eavesdropper hold a fraction 10% (eavesdropping ratio, ER) of the random phase profiles, he will perceive partial information from the decrypted image. Although the ER has further been promoted to 55% [30] and 80% [34] , respectively, by Chen and Zhao, the security problem still exists as the GIEs in these contributions have only one security level. In contrast, our proposal is free from this problem due to the introduction of the second security level (i. e. the XOR operation). Fig. 6(a) shows the decrypted image (CC = 0.4268) when 90% of the random phase profiles are mastered by the eavesdropper. Using the recognition algorithm, he can still regain the XOR-ER [ Fig. 6(b) ]. However, since he does not know the key bit stream for XOR operation, he will obtain an incorrect result [see Fig. 6(c) ] with a randomly generated one. The incorrect result will doubtlessly produce a wrong primary information after the ASCII decoding [see Fig. 6(d) ]. The question mark in Fig. 6(d) represents a failure of ASCII decoding since Matlab returns a question mark while the retrieved value (in decimal format) exceeds 127. Fig. 6 indicates that, in our proposal, the eavesdropper can get no information about the plaintext, even though he masters 90% of the random phase profiles.
Moreover, it is significant to analyze the robustness of the proposal against occlusion attack. Assuming the ciphertexts have an occlusion of 10% at the top, we can get the decrypted result missing its content at the same position [see Fig. 7(a) ]. After recognition [see Fig. 7(b) ] and XOR operation [see Fig. 7(c) ], the 16 of totally 18 characters are successfully retrieved [see Fig. 7(d) ]. Fig. 7 indicates that, unlike many other optical security methods, partial information loss in the ciphertexts of GIE will not influence the whole but only the same area of the decrypted result.
More recently, the GIE scheme has been cracked by chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) [36] . The vulnerability of conventional GIE originates from its inherent linearity. In other words, the attacker can freely manipulate the plaintext in the object beam that linearly reflects the secret key (i.e., the random phase profiles). In our method, the XOR operation break through the linearity of conventional GIE and hence prevent the attacker from directly visiting the object beam. In this sense, it ensure an additional security level of the proposal. Thus it can be claimed that our proposal is totally free from CPA.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a novel method for information encryption based ghost imaging that contains two security levels has been proposed. The origin information are codified into a customized data container and XORed with the key bit stream before being sent to GIE. The primary information can be losslessly retrieved in spite of the strong nosie in GIE. Also, the proposal possesses higher security in comparison with many other available approaches. Numerical results demonstrate that it is feasible and effective.
